This paper provides an efficiency rationale for expenditure equalization in federations. It does so by developing a fiscal federalism model with two citizen types; immobile non-workers and mobile workers. Three decision-makers, a federal transfer authority and two states, play a game as Nash competitors. In any Nash Equilibrium the federal authority chooses an efficient transfer that 'equalizes' for inter-state differences in state benefit and redistributive taxes as well as differences in per capita revenues (economic rents). Since state taxes are equal to per capita state expenditures on services this provides an efficiency rationale for expenditure equalization. Using examples it is shown that Australian equalization gets expenditure equalization in the 'right' direction from an efficiency perspective; from low to high cost states. This is not to say, however, that the magnitude of inter-state transfers induced by expenditure equalization in Australia is efficient.
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Introduction
Most real-world schemes of fiscal equalization focus on equalizing revenue-raising capacities of states or provinces. This is true, for example, in Canada, Switzerland and Germany. An exception, Australia, also equalizes for inter-state differences in the expenditures undertaken by states to provide services. This has been criticized as inefficient because it moves resources to high cost states [Gramlich (1984) ].
Recent reviews have rejected extensions to the Canadian model to allow for expenditure equalization on the grounds that it invites strategic behavior by states, is overly complex and would have no material impact on that country's transfers.
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This paper swims against the tide and provides an efficiency rationale for expenditure equalization. It starts by developing a model of a federation with three decision-makers: two state governments and a federal transfer authority. There are two citizen types, mobile workers who contribute to output and earn income and immobile 'non-workers' who do not participate in the labour market and earn no
income. An exogenous utility target for non-workers is satisfied through federal and state redistribution. Federal redistribution is by way of a uniform and given (federal) tax on workers that provides a private consumption good for non-workers.
State redistribution is by way of a congested service provided to non-workers and funded by a separate (state specific) redistributive tax on workers. This division of the redistributive task reflects the assignment of the welfare function in Australia where the federal government redistributes via cash subsidies that pay for consumption (e.g. unemployment, disability, child support benefits) and states redistribute principally through the direct provision of services (e.g. public housing, transport). Each state also levies a separate benefit tax on workers to pay for a congested service provided specifically to this group. The general results hold with other assumptions about the assignment of redistribution between governments.
A policy game is played in which the decision-makers are benevolent Nash competitors. The federal authority chooses an inter-state transfer to maximize mobile worker welfare subject to an equal utility condition for mobile workers, state feasibility, anticipated worker location choices and the utility target for non workers, 3 See, for example: Achieving a National Purpose: Putting Equalization Back on Track (2006).
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for given state policies. States choose their public services and taxes to maximize worker welfare subject to the same constraints faced by the transfer authority, given the inter-state transfer. In a Nash outcome states choose the benefit tax that funds the public service provided to workers and the redistributive tax to pay for the public service for non-workers. From the perspective of workers the redistributive tax is a negative externality, a fiscal burden they bear without benefit. The redistributive tax in a particular state acts as a deterrent for inwardly migrating workers. A Nash Equilibrium (NE) is characterized in which the federal transfer authority chooses an efficient inter-state transfer.
The results of the paper follow. The efficient inter-state transfer is shown to 'equalize' inter-state differences in the state benefit and redistributive taxes as well as per capita state revenues (economic rents). Since state taxes are equal to per capita expenditures on state services this provides the efficiency rationale for expenditure equalization for both workers and non-workers. The paper then shows how interstate differences in social marginal costs for state services influence the direction of the efficient expenditure equalization transfer. Two numerical examples are used.
The first starts with a symmetric equilibrium and increases the social marginal cost of the service provided to workers in one state relative to the other. It is shown that the efficient transfer must move income (output) from the high to the low cost state.
The second example starts with the same symmetric solution and increases the relative cost of the non-worker service in one state. It is shown that the efficient transfer must now move income (output) in the opposite direction; from the low to high cost state. Thus, the direction of the efficient transfer in response to differential inter-state costs is dependent on whether the service is provided to workers or nonworkers. Since Australian equalization focuses on expenditure equalization with respect to citizens who are essentially non-workers, it is concluded that it has the general direction of transfers resulting from expenditure equalization correct. This does not mean that the magnitude of those transfers is efficient.
The outline is as follows. Section 2 sets up the basic federalism model.
Section 3 characterizes the federal -state policy game. Section 4 demonstrates the 3 efficiency rationale for expenditure equalization. In Section 5 we present the numerical examples demonstrating the direction of transfer. Section 6 concludes.
Model of a federation
Assume a federation with two states each of which has two citizen types differentiated by labor market participation. Specifically, denote the two types as workers and non-workers. Workers have identical preferences, are perfectly mobile across states, contribute to output by each supplying one unit of labor and earn income. 4 Labor supply in state 1 is denoted by and labor supply to state 2 is .
The fixed supply of labor to the federation satisfies the constraint
It is assumed that N, which is also the population of workers in the federation, is
given and hence is a parameter of the model.
Non-workers have identical preferences that can differ from the preferences of workers. Non-workers are immobile and because they do not participate in the labor market, earn no market income. These citizens consume a private good provided by tax revenue raised on an equal per capita basis from workers across the federation. They also consume a state provided public service funded by a statespecific tax on workers. Non-workers may be, for example, citizens less than 18 years of age in secondary, primary or pre-school, people in retirement, the unemployed, recent migrants, those involved in unpaid work within families, citizens with disabilities or indigenous people living in traditional communities. The (given) number of non-workers is denoted by in state 1 and in state 2.
Non-worker immobility could arise from strong attachment to place. This is a reasonable approximation for citizens who make up this group. Indigenous people are attached to traditional lands while the unemployed in large part do not move to 4 Models of fiscal federalism dichotomize state or provincial populations in various ways depending on the research question. Making use of the efficiency wage concept the paper by Boadway, Cuff and Marchand (2002) postulates a model with two mobile worker types, one with low productivity and the other with high productivity. Alternatively, Wildasin (1991) 6 An alternative would be to allow public service social marginal costs to vary with service output. 7 It is possible to allow for migration costs. If these costs are symmetric they can be ignored, as here.
Each non-worker has a quasi-concave continuous and differentiable direct utility function defined over a private good and the benefit from the state service. Define as the utility function of a non-worker and suppose there is a utility target for non-workers in each state such that .
. (2.7)
Here and are assumed to be exogenous and perceived as given by states and the federal transfer authority.
The non-worker utility targets restrict the search for welfare maximizing state policies and federal inter-state transfers to outcomes that cannot make nonworkers worse-off or better off since the constraint holds with equality. This is an important point and means we will look for inter-state transfers that make the workers as well off as feasible without changing non-worker utility. By doing this he analysis avoids outcomes with undesirable equity effects.
There are two alternative ways to proceed. First we could ensure the preservation of non-workers interests by including their well being in the public choice process; for example through an objective function for the states and the federal authority defined over worker and non-worker utility. This leads to wellknown issues relating to welfare functions and the welfare target approach is preferred. Second we could allow the constraints to hold as inequalities requiring non-worker welfare to be greater than or equal to the respective targets. The preference is to solve the model with equality constraints. We are able to show that an efficient transfer makes workers better off for given non-worker utility. The efficient transfer is Pareto improving implying that it creates a welfare surplus some of which could in principle be used to make non-workers better off. Given this it suffices that the non-worker utility targets are equalities and that we can show that an efficient is Pareto improving.
Apart from this theoretical appeal non-worker welfare targets have a natural interpretation. One might suppose that and arise from cultural norms about the standard of living (in utility terms) non-workers should enjoy. Societies have 7 accepted ways of providing for the unemployed, the aged or indigenous citizens.
They would not entertain inter-state transfers that make these citizens worse off. This is certainly so in Australia. With this motivation it is reasonable to assume that cultural norms are also uniform across the federation. The search for welfare maximizing transfers is further restricted with the assumption that .
(2.8)
In Australia, as in many federations, the private consumption of non-workers is met via cash transfers (e.g. unemployment benefits, disability pensions, child care support) through the federal welfare system. Non-workers receive cash benefits and convert them into private consumption. Most services they access are provided by states, for example education, health, public transport and public housing. To reflect this we assume that and are chosen by the federal government exogenous to the model. Since non-workers are the same in each state we suppose that . The federal government provides the same per capita quantity of private good to non-workers regardless of where they live. Given (2.7) and (2.8) this implies . This does not imply the same service output across states.
Taxes and feasibility
Taxes must be paid in each state to fund state local public services and the nonworker private good provided by the federal government. Since only workers participate in the labor market and earn income they pay these taxes. In this respect total expenditure in a state on the service provided to workers is defined as and if one assumes workers meet this cost on an equal per capita basis the tax paid by each worker for their own public service is
This is a benefit tax in the sense that workers receive a benefit in terms of a public service for the tax they pay. The tax is equal to the total per capita expenditure by the state on the service.
State expenditure on the service provided to non-workers is .
Assuming workers alone meet these costs on an equal per capita basis the tax paid by them to fund the non-worker state public service is
This is the redistributive tax that workers pay so that the state can provide to meet the welfare target for non-workers conditional the value of . As with the benefit tax this is just total per capita expenditure by the state on the service. Though this does not mean that each state levies the same tax on workers to provide this benefit to non-workers. This can be seen from (2.10) where the tax varies across states because of different non-worker populations, costs of producing the output that creates the benefit and worker populations (taxpayers). Generally, and the per capita redistributive tax on workers differs across states even though the benefit of the service to non-workers is the same regardless of location.
Assume that the price of the worker and non-worker private good is one. The set consists of state public service social marginal costs, non-worker populations, congestion parameters, the federal non-worker utility target and nonworker private good consumption.
From the equal utility condition for workers the supply of workers to each state is a continuous and differentiable function of state policies and the inter-state transfer conditional on the parameters. This allows one to define
The labour supply functions are needed in order to show how the transfer is chosen.
The federal authority's choice is constrained by worker migration and the equal utility condition for workers. It knows from this that the transfer choice is 1, 2 i = 10 subject to the equal per capita utility condition for workers. A transfer that maximizes worker utility in one state also maximizes worker welfare in the other.
The authority can choose the transfer to maximize per capita worker utility in either state. The choice is the same whether state 1 or 2 is chosen as the decision state.
Federal authority transfer choice
Given this it is assumed that the authority solves Subject to:
(ii)
The first constraint is the worker equal utility condition. The second and third constraints are the state feasibility conditions inclusive of the inter-state transfer. The transfer is assumed to run from state 1 to state 2. The feasibility constraints require total consumption in each state to be equal to state output net of the transfer. The fourth constraint is the (given) non-worker utility target. The last constraint requires that all workers are located in a state. The authority chooses the transfer to make equal per capita utility for workers as large as possible. A critical value for from this optimization must satisfy each constraint. Here is the net marginal social benefit for state 2 of an incremental change in its worker supply, analogous to in interpretation.
Given this the left side of the FONC (3.4) is the net marginal social benefit for state 1 of an incremental change in the inter-state transfer and the right side is the social marginal cost (equal to one). The optimal transfer is the value of that equates the net marginal social benefit with marginal cost, that is, satisfies equation The transfer ensures an allocation of mobile workers across states such that (3.8) is satisfied, namely, the social marginal benefit of adding a worker to state 1 is equal to the social marginal benefit of adding a worker to state 2. The left side of each FONC is the marginal social benefit of the public service while the right side is the marginal social cost. These FONCs (Samuelson conditions) must be satisfied in a solution to the optimization problems of the states.
Optimality
We now define a Nash Equilibrium (NE) to the policy game and examine optimality of any equilibrium. conditions. Any NE to the policy game is Pareto optimal and yields an outcome on the UPF defined between a representative worker and non-worker in each state.
This arises because the federal authority and states are assumed to be benevolent and do not act strategically with respect to each other's choices. With alternative assumptions in relation to benevolence or strategic behavior it is unlikely the transfer authority would choose an efficient transfer, or that states would adopt efficient public service provision. Any NE to a game with malevolent decision makers or strategic behavior will not in general be Pareto optimal. This is of no concern for the purpose here. We have deliberately characterized a Pareto optimal equilibrium free of public choice and strategic behavior distortions in order to focus on the efficient transfer and the way that differences in inter-state costs affect that transfer. This allows the result that cost equalization has an efficiency rationale to be presented in the clearest manner. To examine the same question in the presence of non-benevolence and strategic behavior is beyond the scope of the paper.
Expenditure equalization: efficiency rationale
We now show that the efficient inter-state transfer 'equalizes' for inter-state differences in the per capita expenditure on each service thus providing an efficiency 14 rationale for expenditure equalization. In Appendix C the FONC for the inter-state transfer is re-derived in terms of fiscal and economic rent externalities yielding
The right hand side of the efficient transfer equation consists of terms that capture inter-state differences in the fiscal externalities generated by the benefit and redistributive taxes and economic rents. The equation is standard except for the inclusion of the redistributive taxes. 8 Each term is explained below.
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(i) Benefit tax fiscal externality: Consider the term . The variable is the benefit tax paid by each worker in state 1. This provides a positive fiscal externality for all existing workers in the state depending on the value of alpha. The variable is the benefit tax paid by each worker in state 2. This too is a positive fiscal externality for all existing workers in the state depending on the value of alpha. The term is the congestion -adjusted difference between the per capita benefit tax in states 1 and 2. When (pure public good) each of these taxes confers a positive fiscal externality on all other workers in their respective states which is equal to their tax payment. If the service has a private and public good aspect and the benefit tax paid by a worker provides a positive fiscal externality to all other workers in each state that is less than the tax payment. When (private good) the tax contribution of a worker generates no fiscal externality and . The effect of inter-state differences in the benefit tax, and the fiscal externalities generated by those benefit taxes cancels from the efficient transfer equation. Some might argue that this is a reasonable assumption to make for many services provided by states to workers. In the interests of generality we leave this term in the efficient transfer equation. As noted above this term is a well-known determinant of the efficient transfer.
8 See Boadway (2004) . 9 The federal worker tax T is not an argument of the efficient transfer equation because this tax is uniform across states and has no influence on migration decisions. Thus, the efficient inter-state transfer is a function of differences in the per capita benefit and redistributive taxes levied on workers and per capita economic rents. Recall from (2.9) and (2.10) that these taxes are equal to the per capita expenditure by each state on the services provided to workers and non-workers.
This means that the components of the efficient transfer equation that relate to the differences in taxes, namely, (i) and (ii) The efficient transfer will not necessarily result in equal actual per capita expenditures across states for each public service. This is because there are two public services and because economic rents are present. It is total per capita service expenditures and rents that must be equalized across states.
The direction of expenditure equalization transfers
In this section we examine how inter-state differences in social marginal costs of service provision affect the direction of the efficient inter-state transfer given that the transfer has two components; expenditure and revenue (rent) equalization. Of particular interest is whether the efficient transfer overall should favor high or low cost states. This permits conclusions about the efficiency of real-world equalization schemes that incorporate expenditure equalization.
To do this requires that we analyze how changes in the prices of state services, , , and affect the NE values of the endogenous variables to the game, including the efficient transfer , the key choice variable of interest. As shown, the efficient transfer is determined as part of a system of simultaneous equations (best response functions). For this reason proceeding analytically is problematic and yields few insights so we construct a numerical example using the functional forms , and . Details of the example are provided in Appendix D.
Two comparative static exercises are examined. The first shows how changes in the social marginal cost of the service provided to workers in one state relative to the other state affects the efficient inter-state transfer. The second examines how changes in the social marginal cost of the service provided to nonworkers in one state relative to the other affects the efficient transfer. The direction of the transfer differs for each case. We then increase from 10 to 18. Associated values for the endogenous variables are presented in the rest of the Table. The other parameters are held fixed
State service for workers
at the values noted. Consistent with proposition 1 the first result is that an efficient transfer should equalize for differences in the inter-state marginal cost of providing the public service to workers. The transfer is increasing in the difference between and with negative sign implying that the efficient transfer should reallocate income from the 'high cost' state in favor of the 'low cost' state. substitute their expenditure mix away from the public service in favor of consumption for workers (a movement around an indifference curve defined over and ). These responses re-establish the equal utility equality.
Equal per capita utility for workers is decreasing in so workers are unambiguously worse off with a higher public service price in state 2 despite the migration response. This is shown in the last column of the states with a relatively high social marginal cost of producing the service provided to workers, in favor of states with a relatively low social marginal cost of producing worker services. Table 2 presents the results of the second example. This starts with the same symmetric solution as the first simulation (row 1 of Table 2 ) where all parameters have the values given below the Table. The simulation then increases , the marginal cost of the service provided by states to non-workers, from 10 to 18.
State service for non-workers
Values for the endogenous variables are presented in the rest of the Table while the other parameters are fixed at the values stated. The main result here is that the efficient transfer is now from the low cost to the high cost state. The intuition is as follows. From the symmetric solution an increase in reduces the benefit received from a given output of the non-worker public service. To keep the benefit constant as required by the non-worker utility target state 2 must increase the redistributive tax on workers to increase output of the service. This keeps the benefit constant at the higher price but reduces relative to implying that for given values of the endogenous variables. Workers react to the tax (price) signal and migrate from state 2 to state 1 to escape the higher redistributive tax until a new equality is established. The population of state 1 increases and the population of state 2 decreases.
At each solution apart from the symmetric case in row 1 we have and as in the first simulation. This tends to make the transfer positive:
from state 1 to state 2 (high cost to low cost). Again per capita rents in state 2 are higher than in state 1 as they were in the first simulation and (7.1) holds, tending to make the transfer negative. But now the impact of and outweigh the effect of the difference in rents and the transfer is positive, namely, from the low cost to the high cost state.
Once more each solution in Table 1 is Pareto optimal. While equal per capita worker falls as the cost of the non-worker public service in state 2 increases the decline is less than would be the case with any other transfer. Non-worker utility remains constant throughout the simulation so these citizens are not made worse off or better off as the cost of meeting their utility target (in state 2) increases. An increasing cost in state 2 makes workers worse off, requires a transfer to the high cost state and leaves non-worker utility unchanged. As with the first simulation, workers are made worse off but the efficient transfer minimizes this welfare loss. On welfare grounds one would always implement the efficient transfer since this makes workers as well off as possible in the face of rising costs in one state while holding the non-worker utility constant. This leads to the following 21 Theorem 3: The efficient inter-state transfer should transfer income (output) from states with a relatively low social marginal cost of producing the service provided to non-workers and in favor of states with a relatively high social marginal cost of producing non-worker services.
Policy implications -Australian equalization
To the extent that Australian equalization is driven by inter-state differences in the costs associated with providing services to workers it transfers income (output) in the 'wrong' direction from efficiency perspective. However, to the extent that it is driven by inter-state differences in the costs related to services for non-workers it transfers income (output) in the 'right' direction from an efficiency point of view.
One could argue that Australian expenditure equalization is dominated by inter-state cost differences for services provided to non-workers and hence that in general terms the expenditure component of the Australian model transfers income in the correct direction from an efficiency point of view (from low to high cost states).
Indeed, if one believes that alpha is equal to zero so that services provided to workers are pure private goods then expenditure equalization should only equalize for differences in non-worker service costs, and this is what Australian equalization does.
Conclusion
The paper has modelled a federal economy with two citizen types; immobile non- provision. The efficient transfer should favour high cost states for non-workers services and low cost states for worker services. Thus, Australian equalization gets the transfer in the right direction for state services provided to non-workers but in the wrong direction for services provided to workers. Since Australian equalization is skewed towards estimating expenditure needs for non-workers, one can conclude that, in general, its expenditure equalization transfers are in the 'correct' direction.
Future work would consider how these results might be modified by relaxing three assumptions made in this paper, namely, that redistribution to non-workers is exogenous, that decision makers are benevolent and, finally, that there is no strategic behaviour. All could be fruitful avenues of endeavour to see how the case for expenditure equalization is modified, if at all, by relaxation of these assumptions. Here A is as defined at (3.7) in the main text. Using (7) to (10) 12 Recall that average product is equal to per capita income for workers by assumption.
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Appendix D: Numerical model
From the game in the main text and using the assumed functional forms for utility and output the numerical example has the following equations:
Transfer:
State Taxes 
